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#2A-10/27/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK. EMPIRE STATE COLLEGE). 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8206 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS. ESQ. (ROBERT E. WATERS. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
WILLIAM W. FINEMAN. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the United 
University Professions (UUP) to the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the 
State of New York (State University of New York. Empire State 
College) (State or College) violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of 
the Act by refusing to extend a unit employee's temporary 
appointment and reassigning some of her duties to a nonunion 
tutor because she had filed a grievance against the State. 
Sarah Gallagher has served as a writing and literature 
mentor for the College at its Buffalo Center since 1980. 
Board - U-8206 -2 
When first appointed, she was given a half-time term 
appointment. Since 1981 she has also held a series of 
half-time temporary appointments in addition to her half-time 
term appointments. Gallagher believed that such full-time 
professional obligation warranted a tenure track position for 
which her combination of term and temporary appointments did 
not qualify her. Ultimately, in early August 1984, Gallagher 
filed a grievance which challenged the State's right to 
continue her in full-time status under two separate part-time 
appointments. She sought a full-time term appointment in 
which she could be tenured. 
In June 1985 her last half-time temporary appointment 
A expired and it was not extended. Her term appointment, 
however, was renewed at the same time through June 30. 1988. 
Gallagher's temporary appointments were made on vacant 
"lines" created by leaves of absence granted to other faculty 
members. The "line" Gallagher had been occupying was no 
longer available when her temporary appointment expired in 
June 1985. 
The record establishes that Gallagher was recognized as 
a competent teacher and that there continued to be a need for 
her services as a writing and literature mentor. The record 
also establishes that means existed to grant Gallagher a new 
part-time temporary appointment succeeding the one that 
expired on June 30. 1985, by virtue of other available 
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"lines". College officials testified that it was their 
judgment that greater needs in other instructional areas 
required the decision to assign the other available "lines" 
to other mentors and tutors. 
The ALJ concluded that the record did not establish any 
"relationship between the filing of the grievance and the 
failure to extend or renew Gallagher's temporary appointment 
ten months later. 
In doing so. he credited the testimony of the State's 
witnesses including their testimony that the filing of the 
grievance played no part in their considerations. In 
addition, he found support for his conclusion in several 
facts established by the evidence: (1) the use of tutors was 
an integral part of the instructional system at the College; 
(2) Gallagher's temporary appointment was subject to 
termination at any time; but. although the grievance was 
filed in August 1984. her employment in the temporary 
appointment was continued until June 1985; (3) the temporary 
appointment of another employee was also not extended; the 
other employee had held the same type of temporary 
appointment, had also had good credentials, and had not filed 
any grievance; and (4) after the filing of the grievance, her 
superior, who had concluded that her temporary appointment 
should not be renewed, recommended an increase in her term 
appointment to three-fourths time. 
. 10608 
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In its exceptions. UUP asserts that the ALJ misread the 
record in several respects. In particular, it asserts that 
the ALJ's conclusion that Gallagher's temporary appointment 
was employment at will is inaccurate. It also claims that 
the ALJ's finding that no "line" was available for 
Gallagher's reappointment is inaccurate, and that his 
comparison of Gallagher's situation with that of the other 
employee whose temporary appointment was not extended is 
misleading. UUP asserts that there was a "desperate" need 
for Gallagher's services but that the College hired a new 
employee to teach "exactly what Gallagher taught". In 
conclusion, it contends that there is "no other apparent 
logical reason" for Gallagher's "nonrenewal" except her 
filing of the grievance. 
In its response, the State contests all of UUP's 
assertions, and argues that the record supports the decision 
of the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to sustain UUP's charge, we would have to find, 
on this record, that, but for Gallagher's filing of her 
grievance, the College would have renewed her temporary 
appointment. There is no direct credible evidence of such a 
motive in this rather lengthy record. 
In its absence. UUP argues that that is the only 
"logical" conclusion that the Board can draw from the 
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evidence. The record does establish Gallagher's competence 
as a teacher of literature and writing, a continuing need for 
services in these areas of instruction, and the availability 
of open lines under which her appointment could have been 
extended but which were used to hire others under various 
temporary arrangements. 
However, the testimony of the State's witnesses, which 
the ALJ fully credited, established that, while other lines 
were available, judgments were made concerning the 
educational needs of the College which prompted a use for 
those lines in areas for which Gallagher was not most 
competent to teach. Nothing which UUP has produced warrants 
a rejection of the credibility determination and a finding 
that the explanations given by the State's witnesses were 
pretextual. 
The factors relied upon by the ALJ support his 
credibility determination that the State was not improperly 
motivated. It is clear that under the Policies of the State 
University. Gallagher's temporary appointment was subject to 
termination at any time. Thus, we agree that there is, at 
best, only a tenuous temporal relationship between the filing 
of the grievance and the actions complained of. Furthermore, 
the conduct of Gallagher's superiors, both with regard to the 
expiration of the temporary appointment of another employee 
and the recommendation for an increased term appointment for 
10610 
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her. is inconsistent with any suspicion of improper 
motivation in violation of the Act. 
The record reveals that Empire State College is an 
unusual educational institution in which instruction is not 
given in the traditional manner. Under a system of 
individualized "learning contracts", instruction is not 
offered generally through customary classes but by means of a 
system of independent studies aided by so-called mentors, 
tutors and other adjunct faculty. Inasmuch as instructional 
needs and even enrollment may vary from time to time during 
the year, much use is made of temporary part-time 
appointments. UUP argues that this system permits 
"manipulation" of appointments, and that this case represents 
such an abuse. The State urges that the system must be 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the constantly changing 
instructional needs of the College. For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to find, as we do. that the reasons given for the 
decisions not to extend Gallagher's temporary appointment and 
to give a temporary appointment to a tutor are rationally 
related to the academic concerns of this particular 
institution. In so finding, we reject UUP's proposition that 
the only "logical" conclusion that we can draw from the 
evidence is that the College would have renewed Gallagher's 
temporary appointment but for her filing of her grievance. 
Board - U-8206 
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Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed and WE 
ORDER that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its 
entirety. 
DATED: Oc tobe r 27 , 1986 
Al bany , JNewJTiorJc 
W-<^g^, 
arold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
mz 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
OTSELIC VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and=. CASE NO. U-8586 
OTSELIC VALLEY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
LOCAL 2908, 
Charging Party. 
ANTHONY MASSAR. for Respondent 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Otselic 
Valley Teachers Association, Local 2908 (Association) to a 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge against the Otselic Valley Central School District 
(District). The charge alleged that the District 
unilaterally reassigned unit work to a nonunit teacher aide 
in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. 
The ALJ found, on the basis of the record evidence, that 
the alleged unit work done by the teacher aide was not the 
type of work that had been assigned exclusively to the unit 
employees represented by the Association. 
10613 
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The Association represents all professionally certified 
personnel including the title of library media specialist 
(LMS). The latter position is also referred to in the record 
as "teacher/librarian". 
The District has one elementary school and one 
junior-senior high school. Until December 31, 1985, it 
employed one LMS at each school. With the retirement of the 
elementary school LMS at the end of 1985, the District began 
using the one remaining LMS to cover both schools, leaving 
the elementary school without an LMS each afternoon. Until 
early February 1986, afternoon library classes at the 
elementary school were taken by a substitute teacher. The 
District then assigned Carr, a teacher aide, to full-time 
duty in the elementary school library. 
Conceding that most of Carr's duties are part of an 
aide's functions, the Association points solely to the fact 
that among her activities Carr reads to the children in her 
care. The sole issue therefore presented in this case is 
whether reading to the children constitutes exclusive unit 
work. 
There is evidence in the record that from 1973 to 1980, 
when some elementary school children were taught at the 
junior-senior high school, the high school library aide 
would read stories to them to the extent that time and their 
schedule permitted. The story reading was one part of the 
10614 
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children's entertainment, which also included filmstrips, 
movies or records. These activities were rotated so that 
students in each of the four classes involved had a story-
read to them about once a month. 
From 1980, when these elementary school children were 
transferred to the elementary school, until 1986, the 
library aide at the high school had no occasion to read to 
students. When Carr was assigned as the library aide in 
1986, she devoted her time to carding, filing, repairing and 
shelving of books and periodicals, among other conceded 
aide's functions. She testified, however, that after 
children selected their books she would sometimes read them 
a story if time was available. 
In its exceptions the Association argues that the 
record does not support the ALJ's conclusion that reading of 
stories to elementary school children was a regular aspect 
of a library aide's functions. It urges that we should find 
that Carr is performing teacher unit work to the extent that 
she reads to elementary school children. 
DISCUSSION 
We have recently held that with respect to a charge 
alleging unilateral transfer of unit work "the initial 
essential questions are whether the work had been performed 
by unit employees exclusively and whether the reassigned 
tasks are substantially similar to those previously 
1C615 
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1/ performed by unit employees."- The instant record contains 
no evidence regarding the duties of the LMS. It appears to be 
assumed by both parties that one of their functions was to read 
to the children. The Association does not identify any other 
task that the library aide does that is alleged to be 
substantially similar to that done by the LMS. 
The issue is presented, therefore, whether such reading was 
performed exclusively by the LMS. The only witnesses were the 
two library aides, whose testimony fully supports the ALJ' s 
conclusion that reading to elementary school children for their 
entertainment was a regular part of the aides' duties when they 
dealt with elementary school children. On this record we cannot 
find that such reading activities were performed exclusively by 
unit employees. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 27, 1986 
Albany, New York 
-7i£u*e£Z/£ / ^ S ^ ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UM/G-^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
1/Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. 18 PERB 
1P083. at p. 3182 (1985). 
Oi 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK. 
Respondent, : 
-and- CASE NO. U-8696 
CHARLES LOIACONO. 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS P. RYAN. ESQ., (BARBARA A. JACCOMA. ESQ. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BRUCE K. BRYANT. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Charles 
Loiacono to a decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing his improper practice charge against the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District) as untimely. The charge alleges that the District 
terminated the charging party's probationary services as 
principal in retaliation for his having filed a grievance. 
The termination of such probationary services was effective 
December 29. 1978. Thereafter, the charging party utilized 
the District's internal review procedures as well as pursuing 
his grievance through arbitration and subsequent court 
review. At the conclusion of these proceedings, seven years 
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later, on January 9, 1986, the Chancellor reaffirmed the 
discontinuance of probationary services as of December 29, 
1978. The instant charge was filed on April 23, 1986. 
The ALJ determined that the four-month period of 
limitations imposed by §204-a.l of the Board's Rules of 
Procedure began to run from December 29, 1978, the date on 
which occurred "the definitive act which effectively changed 
his employment." Consequently, he dismissed the charge as 
untimely. In doing so, the ALJ also rejected the charging 
party's contention that the Board's four-month period of 
limitations should be tolled pending exhaustion of the 
internal administrative review procedures. 
In his exceptions, the charging party reiterates his 
contention that the period of limitations should begin to run 
only after what he characterizes as the Chancellor's "final 
determination" on January 9, 1986. The charging party 
further urges that we should hold that the period of 
limitations should not begin to run until "internal 
administrative remedies" have been exhausted. The District 
responds that the Chancellor's decision of December 29, 1978 
effectively discontinued Loiacono's services. It points out 
that Loiacono has not held the position of high school 
principal since that date. It urges that the internal review 
proceedings do not affect the finality of the decision to 
terminate probationary services, which is no different than a 
denial of tenure. The Chancellor's reaffirmation on 
10618 
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January 9, 1986 was no more than denial of reconsideration, 
according to the District. 
DISCUSSION 
The charging party's argument raises two separate 
questions: 1} From what act does this Board's four-month 
period of limitations begin to run? and 2) Should the 
four-month period be tolled pending Loiacono's use of the 
internal review procedures? As to the first question, the 
period begins to run from the act which effectively 
terminated his employment as principal. If the charging 
party continued to be employed as principal pending the 
review proceedings then it could not be said that the 
termination took place on December 29, 1978. It is clear, 
however, that the termination was effective on that date. 
The review proceedings did not suspend that termination. 
While the review proceedings might have resulted in the 
reversal of the decision, with consequent appropriate 
remedies, the act of termination took place on the earlier 
date and the Chancellor's action of January 9. 1986 was, in 
fact, no more than a denial of reconsideration of the 
District's action of termination. 
The second question recognizes that the period of 
limitations might have begun to run from the decision taken 
on December 29, 1978, but that the period should be tolled 
pending completion of the internal review proceedings. The 
charging party argues that we should, at least as a matter of 
Board - U-8696 -4 
policy, apply the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in our application of our Rule. 
Application of the concept of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies might be appropriate if this Board 
were the proper forum to review the issues litigated in the 
internal review proceedings. But we have no jurisdiction to 
review the propriety of the decision to terminate the 
charging party's probationary services. The only issue that 
this Board can determine is whether such termination was 
improperly motivated within the meaning of the Taylor Law. 
At the same time, it must be noted that by virtue of our 
exclusive statutory jurisdiction, the internal review 
proceedings could not properly be the forum to litigate 
allegations of improper practices under the Taylor Law. It 
is clear, therefore, that there is no reason to delay the 
application of the improper practice provisions of the Act 
and our Rules until internal review proceedings are 
completed. For these reasons, the cases cited by the 
charging party for the proposition that internal review 
proceedings must be exhausted before judicial review may be 
instituted are inapposite to our functions. 
Furthermore, in the charge filed with us in 1986, the 
conduct alleged to constitute the improper practice took 
place on or before December 29, 1978. Since the charging 
10620 
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party alleges only that the decision made on December 29. 
1978 was taken in retaliation for his having filed a 
grievance against his superior, it is clear that that issue 
was ripe for consideration by us at that time. The 
appropriate course of action would have been to file a charge 
with this Board at the same time that the internal review 
procedures were utilized to raise other issues. 
Accordingly, the ALJ's decision should be affirmed. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed as untimely. 
DATED: October 27. 198 6 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF WOLCOTT, 
Employer, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL 506. INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Union Local 506. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All regular full-time and part-time 
employees employed in the highway, 
water and sewer departments of the 
Village of Wolcott. 
• 1C622 
CASE NO. C - 3 0 8 8 
'"N 
Certification - C-3088 page 2 
Excluded: Clerical employees, police and fire 
department employees, supervisors, 
building code enforcement officer and 
zoning enforcement officer. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Union Local 506, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: October 27. 1986 
Albany. New York 
£*4*—3^&~^y 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
UjjtA^ Y 
Walter L. E i s e n b e r g . Membe 
Jerome Lefkcwitz , fcientoer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD HOUSING AUTHORITY. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3056 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION, 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their non-exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Town of Hempstead Housing Authority 
employees, including Laborer, Clerk-
Typist I, Clerk-Typist II, Clerk-Typist 
III, Store Keeper I, Store Keeper II. 
Store Keeper III, Accountant I, 
) Accountant II. Accountant III. 
Maintenance Mechanic I. Maintenance 
1C&24 
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Excluded: 
Mechanic II., Custodial Worker I, 
Custodial Worker II, Maintenance 
Carpenter Foreman, Maintenance Plumber 
Foreman, and Maintenance Electrician 
Foreman. 
Executive Director, Assistant Director 
of Maintenance, and Secretary__t_cL the 
Director. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: October 27, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Uuic^ £ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
